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Extending current situation-based conceptualizations of crisis response, the 
authors have developed a more universal and systemic approach to understanding 
the role of emotions in crises. The authors’ Integrated Crisis Mapping (ICM) 
model is based on a public-based, emotion-driven perspective where different 
crises are mapped on two continua, the organization’s involvement with the crisis 
issue and primary public’s coping strategy.  The initial test suggested theoretical 
rigor in the model and found that publics involved in crises pertaining to 
reputational damage, technological breakdown, industrial matters, labor unrest, 
and regulation/legislation, are likely to feel anxious, angry, and sad. At the same 
time, they are likely to engage in conative coping and take active steps to restore 
some semblance of normalcy within their immediate environment. As counter-
intuitive as this may appear, organizations embroiled in these crises need only to 
engage moderately, rather than intensely, in reaching out to the publics. This 
study is the first of a series of studies to generate what Yin (2003) termed 
“analytic generalization” (p. 33). The findings from this study, arguably, represent 
the imprints of an initial trail that may open up to a possibly new vista of research 
in crisis communication. 
 
How to shape the appropriate strategies in response to a crisis is critical for any given 
organization and public relations practitioner working in the field of crisis communication. 
Given that the goals of crisis communication, defined as the “ongoing dialogue between the 
organization and its publics” prior to, during, and after the crisis (Fearn-Banks, 2002, p. 2) are to 
restore organizational normalcy, influence pubic perception, and regain and repair image and 
reputation, strategies used should be “designed to minimize damage to the image of the 
organization” (p. 2). Strategies, argued Massey (2001), are “message repertoires that are 
designed to repair the organization’s image by influencing stakeholder perceptions” (p. 155). 
Ray (1999) argued that strategies establish and enact “control (at least in its appearance) in the 
face of high uncertainty” (p. 19). Lukaszweski (1997) argued that the strategic management of 
message response in crisis communication is a “fundamental communication principle” (p. 8). 
Designing sound strategic communications and tactics to communicate crisis so as to minimize 
damage to the image of the organization has been described as “management at its zenith” 
(Stocker, 1997, p. 203).  
While most of these strategies are often characterized as direct responses to the crisis 
(Cowden & Sellnow, 2002; Fearn-Banks, 2002; Fink, 1986; Harrison, 1999; Massey, 2001; 
Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Seegar & Ulmer, 2002; Ulmer, 2001), Ray (1999) argued that 
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strategies would either, (1) deny the crisis exists; (2) provide “partial, inaccurate, or delayed 
information”; or (3) maintain an open communication channels with constituents (p. 20).  
Current Situation-Based Conceptualization of Crisis Response 
Arguably, the two dominant theories on crisis strategies, Benoit’s (e.g., 1994; 1995; 
1997; 1999; 2004) image repair strategies, and Coombs’ (e.g., 1995; 1998) crisis response 
strategies, are designed to understand what strategies are relevant to use under what 
circumstances. These often stem from a situation-based response to crisis. The image repair 
theory is appropriate to be used when the situation leads to a loss of face. When face is 
threatened, face works is used to repair image, argued Benoit & Brinson (1994). This usually 
occurs when the accused is believed to have committed an offensive act by its salient audience 
(Benoit, 2004). Face, image, and reputation are extremely important commodities, argued Benoit 
and Brinson (1994), because, as a society, we pride ourselves on, and value those who enact 
tolerance, and sensitivity, to the feelings and traditions of others (Brinson & Benoit, 1999). 
Coombs’ (1998) strategies are positioned according to the situation based on the organization’s 
locus of control. On one hand, when the organization is deemed to have strong personal control 
over the crisis, more accommodative strategies like full apology are recommended for use. On 
the other hand, when the organization has weak control over the crisis, more defensive strategies 
like attack and denial are recommended.  
ICM Model: Conceptualizing Emotions in Crisis Responses 
While these situation-based crisis responses serve as vital roadmaps to understand the 
crisis situation, it is argued that a more universal and systemic approach would be to shape crisis 
responses from an emotion-based perspective: To understand what are the emotional upheavals 
that the publics involved in the crisis are likely to experience so that strategies can be streamlined 
to address their specific needs. Studies argued that the perception of a crisis, particularly from a 
given public, is not strictly a function of an environmental stimulus itself, but involves an 
interpretation of the stimulus (Carver & Blaney, 1977). Emotion is argued to be a critical 
stimulus. Lazarus (1991) defined emotion as “organized cognitive-motivational-relational 
configurations whose status changes with changes in the person-environment relationship as this 
is perceived and evaluated (appraisal)” (p. 38). In a crisis, as the conflict between the publics and 
the organization develops, emotions are one of the anchors in the publics’ interpretation of what 
is unfolding, changing, and shaping.  
Jin, Pang, and Cameron (2007) have developed a new approach called the Integrated 
Crisis Mapping model (ICM) aimed at understanding the diverse and varied emotions likely to 
be experienced by the key stakeholders. Dominant emotions in the ICM model, developed from 
integrating works from psychology and crises literature, are extrapolated on two continua. On the 
X-axis is the publics’ coping strategy (from cognitive to conative coping), which consists of the 
primary public’s cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific external or internal 
demands and on the Y-axis is the level of organizational involvement (from high to low). 
Different types of crises, drawn from the crisis literature, are mapped into each of the four 
quadrants, with the dominant and secondary emotions posited. 
As an initial attempt to test the theoretical robustness and ecological validity of the ICM 
model, this study examines five crises posited in the first quadrant, crises we infer  require the 
publics’ conative coping and high organizational involvement, where the primary emotion 
identified is anger, followed by anxiety. These cases are studied for their instrumental value 
rather than intrinsic value. In instrumental case study methodology, Stake (1998) argued that the 
cases are examined to provide “insight into an issue or refinement of theory” (p. 88). The five 
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crises examined are the pretexting scandal involving Hewlett Packard, an example of 
reputational damage; Dell’s battery recall, an example of technological breakdown; the Sago 
mining crisis, an example of industrial crisis; Ford Motors’ job cuts, an example of labor 
unrest/protest; and Military Commissions Act of 2006, an example of regulatory/legislative 
minefield. Data to examine the five crises come from content analyses of the population of 
stories published in the largest circulating and widely influential national newspapers, USA 
Today, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post (Audit 
Bureau of Circulation, 2006; Viguerie & Franke, 2004).  To ensure that media coverage reflects 
organizational perspectives, the respective organizations’ websites were accessed to analyze their 
official announcements through press releases. However, as such information were not available 
in two of the five cases, namely the Ford Motors and Military Commissions Act 2006 cases, the 
authors decided to analyze only media coverage for all cases for more comparable analyses. 
This study pushes boundaries on four fronts. First, we attempt to understand how an 
organization and its primary public appraise a crisis; second, how different organizational 
involvement levels and public coping strategies can lead to different positioning on the crisis 
map driven by the primary emotion conjured in the primary public; and third, how different crisis 
mapping can impact organizational response. Fourth, and more significantly, this represents our 
initial attempt to build a new theoretical framework. Saunders (2004) argued that applying theory 
to real life situations is “useful towards theory building” because such situations “provide 
observations grounded in actual organizational efforts aimed at solving actual organizational 
problems” (p. 140). Five cases of the same phenomenon were explored in order to construct a 
more robust study (Yin, 1993). This study represents the first of subsequent empirical tests to 
understand the theoretical and practical rigors of our ICM model. The authors are excited to 
understand how well the hypotheses posited in our model hold up, and what subsequent 
refinements need to be made to stand the scrutiny of scholarship as well as its relevance to the 
practitioners’ world. Through the building of this model, it is the authors’ goal to advance our 
current understanding in crisis communication and offers practical insights to scholars and 
practitioners on how they can understand, with greater preciseness, the emotional upheavals their 
primary publics are likely to experience so that they can shape the appropriate crisis response 
and tools to manage the crisis with optimal effectiveness. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Primary Publics in Crises 
Publics are a “group of people who face a common issue” (Gonzelez-Herrero & Pratt, 
1996, p. 84). In a crisis, the publics have been defined differently, according to their importance 
to resolving situation, their functional roles, and their long-term influences. Lukaszweski (1997) 
argued that there are four key publics that the organization must communicate with, and 
priorities must be made to communicate with them as soon as possible. They are: (1) Those most 
directly affected, the victims; (2) The employees, who may bear the brunt of the wrath from the 
publics; (3) Those indirectly affected like families and relatives; and (4) The news media and 
other channels of external communication. Dougherty (1992) preferred to examine publics in 
terms of their functional roles. Enabling publics, which include shareholders, board of directors 
and regulatory agencies, have the power and authority to control the organization’s resources. 
Functional publics mainly consist of the organization’s consumers. Normative publics are 
formed because of shared values, like political or interest groups. Diffused publics are people 
who are not members of a formal organization, yet, nonetheless, powerful groups. Ulmer (2001) 
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categorized publics in terms of their long-term influences. He regarded the primary public as the 
community in which the organization works, and the employees. The customer and the media 
would be classified as a secondary public.  
In crisis situations, we thus propose that the primary publics comprise the following 
characteristics: 1) They are most affected by the crisis; 2) They have shared common interests, 
and destiny, in seeing the crisis resolved; and 3) They have long-term interests, and influences, 
on the organization’s reputation and operation. 
Range of Emotions in Crises 
Core Relational Themes.   According to Lazarus (1991), core relational theme refers to 
person-environment relationships that come together with personal meaning and the appraisal 
process.  In the processing of emotion in a crisis, the key lies in the central relational harm or 
benefit in the relational encounters that underlies each specific kind of emotion evoked by either 
party’s expression and behavior. When the implications of well-being are appraised by the other 
party, each relationship may produce an appraisal and hence a response consistent with the 
theme and the emotion that flows from the expression or behavior of the other party. 
Appraisal.   Lazarus (1991) proposed that there are two types of appraisal: primary vs. 
secondary.  Specifically, primary appraisal addresses whether and how an encounter or situation 
is relevant to one’s own well-being. Its components include goal relevance, goal congruence or 
incongruence, and the involvement of the party. In the processing of emotion from the public’s 
point of view, the central issue of the crisis is always goal relevance. Understandably, the goal 
relevance from the perspectives of both the public, and the organization, involved in the same 
crisis are likely to differ.   
Secondary appraisal refers to an evaluation of one’s options and resources for coping 
with the situation and future prospects (Lazarus, 1991), which means whether action is required, 
and if so, what kind of action ought to be taken.  These comprise three components: Blame or 
credit, coping potential, and future expectancy.  In a crisis situation, blaming takes precedence 
over credits.  The coping potential, and future expectancy, specify any given action the public or 
the organization might take to prevent harm, and how it manages the demands of the crisis 
situation, and whether the strategy is feasible, and what result is expected.   
Public Responses Based on Key Emotions 
 Based on the above appraisal model of emotion, Jin, Pang, and Cameron (2007) have 
proposed a theoretical framework to understand the primary publics’ crisis responses, as 
evidenced by the predominant emotion elicited by different types of crises.  In a crisis, Lazarus 
(1991) argued that there are predominantly six negative emotions (Anger, Fright, Anxiety, Guilt, 
Shame, and Sadness) based upon different appraisal, driven by different core relational themes. 
For the purposes of organizational understanding, we would argue that four of the six (anger, 
fright, anxiety, and sadness) are dominant emotions experienced by the publics, with guilt and 
shame secondary or subsumed emotions, particularly external publics, like victims, who are less 
subject to guilt or shame. 
Insert Figure 1 about here* 
Anger. The core relational theme underlying anger is a demanding offense against “me” 
and “mine” (Lazarus, 1991). In crisis situation, the primary publics tend to experience anger 
when facing a demanding offense from certain organization against them or their well being. In 
an organizational context, the primary public will want to find out what the organization has 
been doing is relevant on  two levels. First, the ego-involvement of the public is engaged to 
preserve or enhance their identity or benefit in the situation. Second, there is usually an issue of 
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blaming. Specifically, this blame derives from the knowledge that the organization is 
accountable for the harmful actions and they could have been controlled or even prevented by 
the organization. The organization is invariably the object of blame. 
 As far as coping strategy development and action tendency assessment are concerned, the 
primary public might potentially favor attack as the strategy in facing the organization. More 
specifically, if future expectancy of the attack is positive, they are more likely to put the attack 
strategy into practice. However, anger can disappear when the defense against the organization is 
successful. It will continue to fester when their initial self-defense failed. At the stance and 
strategy level, though sometimes the public may appear cooperative, anger can be expressed 
indirectly in passively aggressive tactics, which the organization would well seek to detect if it 
wants to identify the appropriate strategies to deal with such emotional outrage. 
Fright. The core relational theme underneath fright is facing uncertain and existential 
threat (Lazarus, 1991). In terms of the public’s appraisal process, they find the situation of 
dealing with the organization as goal relevant yet incongruent.  Organization-based identity issue 
or ego-involvement issue might or might not be relevant in the fright.  Secondly, given the nature 
of the crisis, the public may either blame the organization or not.     
 As far as coping strategy is concerned, the public is not certain about how to cope with 
the loss as well as how the involved organization may handle this situation.  Depending on their 
resource and power, they may choose avoidance or escape from the crisis as a viable recourse 
(action tendency). 
Anxiety. By definition, anxiety stems from the core relational theme as facing an 
immediate, concrete, and overwhelming danger (Lazarus, 1991). The public may feel 
overwhelmed by the crisis situation and look for the immediate solutions. Accordingly, the 
public may go through the following appraisal process: They may assess the situation as relevant 
but not congruent with their goal of survival. Their ego-involvement is evidenced as the effort to 
protect their own ego-identity against the organization whom they perceive to be the direct 
source of existential threat.  Secondly, they might blame or not blame the organization depending 
on their environment assessment. Given the uncertainty of how to cope with the situation and 
what the organization might react, they tend to avoid and escape. Noticeably, the action 
tendencies of publics under fright and anxiety overlap. This may give crisis managers in the 
organization sufficient consolidation of resources to effectively deal with the publics under these 
situations. 
Sadness.  Having experienced an irrevocable loss in the core relational theme of the 
emotion of sadness (Lazarus, 1991). In those cases, the public suffers from tangible or intangible 
loss or both.  Their goal of survival is threatened and this loss of any type of ego-involvement 
(e.g., esteem, moral values, ideal, people and their well-being, etc.) caused by uncontrollable 
sources may lead them no one to blame and in desperate need for relief and comfort.  If they 
perceive the loss can be restored or compensated for, their sadness may not occur or will be 
associated with hope.  For successful crisis management, the organization might consider 
creating a favorable expectation by associating their efforts with hope while disassociating the 
situation with hopelessness and depression. The action tendency of the public might well depend 
on what measures the organization may take. 
The primary level emotion is the one the public experiences at the first, or immediate, 
instance. The secondary level emotion is one the public experiences in subsequent instances, as 
time goes by, and contingent upon the organization’s responses to the crisis. The secondary level 
emotion may be transferred from the dominant emotion or coexisting with the primary level.  In 
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this study, we focus on the Quadrant with Anger as the primary emotion and Anxiety as the 
secondary emotion as conjured by crises in reputational damage, technological breakdown, 
industrial crisis, labor unrest/protest, and regulation/legislation. 
Operationalization of the ICM Model 
 As Figure 1 illustrates, the ICM model is indicated by a crisis matrix based on two axes: 
The analysis of the organizational involvement level in the crisis that can be examined through a 
scale of high involvement and low involvement, and the primary public’s coping strategy from 
conative coping to cognitive coping.  It is argued that for effective crisis management, the 
organization, at varied involvement level in different issues, must understand the primary 
public’s emotional demands so as to communicate accordingly and align with the coping strategy 
needed by the primary public (Jin, Pang, & Cameron, 2007). 
On the X-axis is the public’s coping strategy. Adapting the cognitive appraisal theory in 
emotion  (Lazarus, 1991), there are two types of coping: 1) problem-focused coping – changing 
the actual relationship between the public and the organization via actual measures and steps, 
and 2) cognitive-focused coping – changing only the way in which the relationship is interpreted 
by the public. As the key components of appraisal process, this involves coping strategies and 
action tendency. During the coping process, the publics can alter or revise their interpretations 
based on the exigency of the situation. For instance, an accident, which demands high 
involvement from the organization and necessitates a cognitive coping strategy, may begin with 
sadness as the primary level dominant emotion. A secondary level response might be fright, 
when the results are not evident or satisfactory, as they normally are, given the extenuating 
circumstances of the crisis. 
Coping strategy refers to the dominant choice of the publics in dealing with the crisis 
situation: Either 1) cognitive coping – the public try to sort out a way of thinking or interpreting 
the meaning of the crisis with regard to their well-being, or 2) conative coping – the public try to 
manage the situation so as to alter a troubled relationship or to sustain a desirable one by taking 
actions or at least show their tendency of action.  Anchoring these two coping strategies to the 
axis, different primary publics in different crises may choose different coping strategy along this 
continuum.  Therefore, this X-axis consists of cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage 
specific external or internal demands (and conflicts between them) that are appraised as 
exceeding the resources of the public.  
On the Y-axis is the level of organizational involvement, ranging from high to low. In 
each of the quadrants are categorizations of crisis types, conceptualized based on three criteria: 
1) Internal-external; 2) Personal-public; and 3) Unnatural-natural.  An external-public-natural 
crisis, like economic downturn, natural disaster, and accident, would likely call for higher level 
of involvement from the organization. For instance, the 2005 Tsunami disaster that swept across 
most parts of Asia is one no government could ever plan for. Coombs (1998) categorized these 
events as external locus of control and weak personal responsibility on the organization’s part. 
At the same time, some variations of catastrophe, involving internal-public-natural or unnatural, 
like labor unrest, and loss of reputation as a result of mismanagement, require high 
organizational involvement as well. While serious, some internal-personal-unnatural (i.e., man-
made) crises, like human resource problems involving employees, or psychopathic acts, 
necessitate relatively less intense organizational involvement, particularly when the organization 
did not cause these problems to arise. Jin, Pang and Cameron (2007) defined high organizational 
involvement as intense, consolidated, sustained, and high priority in allocation of resources to 
deal with the crisis; on the contrary, low organizational involvement does not mean cursory or no 
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involvement, but that the organization devotes comparatively less resources, effort, and energy to 
deal with the crisis, either because the organization recognizes there is little it can do, or when 
the organization did not cause the crisis, it is depending on external help, like a regulatory 
agency, to help it resolve the crisis. 
Emotions and coping strategy.  The two axes further form four quadrants in the crisis 
matrix.  In each of the quadrants is the dominant emotion, based on the confluence, interactions, 
and inter-relations of the publics’ coping strategy as well as organizational involvement.   
Quadrant 1: High involvement/Conative coping: Anger is fueled, and abated, by the 
organization’s high involvement. On the immediate level, the publics may feel angry because 
they held the organization responsible. On the secondary level, they may feel anxious when they 
feel the organization is not doing enough. The conative coping strategy is driven by action 
tendency, the feeling that the public can, and must, something about the situation. 
Quadrant 2: High involvement/Cognitive coping: The primary level emotion is sadness; 
and the secondary level emotion is fright. These are crises which give rise to emotion which 
primary publics can only comprehend at the cognitive level. With further comprehension based 
on coping strategy, these may give rise to a suppressed emotion. 
Quadrant 3: Low involvement/cognitive coping: Conversely, the primary level emotion is 
fright, especially when the primary public realizes that there is little the organization can do, or 
the organization is devoting relatively less resources to the crisis. Fright may give way to 
sadness, a further manifestation of the helplessness of the situation. 
Quadrant 4: Low involvement/Conative coping: Anxiety is caused by the perception of 
the organization’s low involvement and possible inertia. On the immediate level, the publics may 
feel anxious because they felt the organization is not doing enough. This may give rise to anger, 
and anger may lead them to take matters in their own hands.  
In this study, we focus on testing Quadrant 1 (High Involvement/Conative Coping), the 
first of subsequent empirical tests to examine the theoretical and practical rigors of our model. 
Given the proposed attributes of crises in this quadrant, we seek to understand, through the five 
cases,  
RQ1: What are the primary emotions displayed by the primary publics, as evidenced in 
the news coverage? 
RQ2: What is the extent of the organizations’ involvements in the crises, as evidenced in 
the news coverage? 
According to Lazarus (1991), after the evaluation of one’s options and resources for 
coping with the situation, decision on future prospects needs to be made such as whether action 
is required, and if so, what kind of action ought to be taken.  In a crisis situation, blaming takes 
precedence over credits.  The coping potential, and future expectancy, specify any given action 
the public or the organization might take to prevent harm, and how it manages the demands of 
the crisis situation, and whether the strategy is feasible, and what result is expected.  Thus, we 
seek to examine, 
RQ3: What coping strategies were evident by primary publics, as evident in the news 
coverage? 
RQ4: What, if any, is the difference in perception of the degree in organizational 
involvement in each of the crises between the organization and the publics? 
RQ5: What, if any, is the difference in perception of the degree of the public’s coping 
strategy in each of the crises between the organization and the publics? 
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Method 
We attempt to understand the veracity and rigor of our model using content analyses of 
cases, as evidence in media coverage. Case studies allow the researcher to delve into and explain, 
the uniqueness and complexity of organizational processes, and as Gummesson (2000) argued, to 
capture the essential processes of decision-making, implementation and change. The purpose of 
case studies is to empirically investigate a “contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context” and address a “situation in which the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident” (Yin, 1993, p. 59). The five cases examined here would be what Stake 
(1994) described as the “epistemology” of the particulars and should thus not been regarded as a 
sample of two. 
In this study, we adopt a multiple case study design within the same phenomenon, with 
the primary interest of understanding how our model works. The cases are thus studied for their 
instrumental value rather than intrinsic value (Stake, 1998). Though the cases are analyzed in 
detail, contexts examined, and activities explored, these play supporting roles to the researchers’ 
objectives, which are to facilitate understanding of how relevant they are to the model. 
Consequently, by applying the method on five disparately managed cases, Yin (1993) argued, is 
an appropriate initial attempt at theory testing (p. 64), with the aim of building “analytic 
generalizations” (Yin, 2003, p. 33) from the conceptualization.  
Based on this approach, the authors seek to understand: first, how an organization and its 
primary public appraise the crisis; second, how different organizational involvement levels and 
public coping strategies lead to different positioning on the crisis map driven by the primary 
emotion conjured in the primary public; and third, what organizations can learn from this model.  
Sample 
Five crises are selected based on the opinions and suggestions of a group of public 
relations practitioners and educators. Shin, Cheng, Jin, and Cameron (2005) found this to be a 
viable way of identifying the appropriate crises to analyze. The five cases are: Hewlett Packard 
case, an example of reputational damage; Dell’s battery recall, an example of technological 
breakdown; the Sago mining crisis, an example of industrial crisis; Ford Motors’ job cuts, an 
example of labor unrest/protest; and Military Commissions Act of 2006, an example of 
regulatory/legislative minefield. Data to examine Quadrant 1 of the ICM model comes from 
content analyses of the population of stories published in the largest circulating and widely 
influential national newspapers, USA Today, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Los Angeles 
Times, and Washington Post (Audit Bureau of Circulations, 2006; Viguerie & Franke, 2004). 
News stories in the five major newspapers (N=259) were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by 
typing in the key words of the organization and the crisis.  News stories were excluded if 1) there 
was no comment made by a spokesperson from the respective organization or official from the 
organization or no mention of any official communication from the organization; or 2) the stories 
were in the same publication or there was no mention of the crisis. 
Hewlett Packard Case: HP’s internal leak crisis became public September 6, 2006 when 
the company filed documents with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Media coverage on 
the leak investigation lasted for months, but the articles analyzed focused on coverage until 
September 22, 2006, the day that the chairwoman of the board Patricia Dunn resigned. The 
population of HP news stories were obtained from September 6 to 22, 2006. News stories were 
uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the key words (HP, H-P and Hewlett Packard) which 
yielded 135 stories. Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 82.  
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Dell Case: The crisis surrounding Dell’s battery recall began on August 14, 2006 with the 
organization’s official announcement of the recall. The recall was voluntary and lasted until 
September 29, 2006 when the company announced an update on the situation. The majority of 
news coverage occurred during the first two weeks of the recall. The population of Dell news 
stories published on the five newspapers from August 14 to September 30, 2006, from the first 
official communication by Dell to one day after the last release on the topic by Dell.  News 
stories were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the key words (Dell and battery) which 
yielded 31 stories. Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 20.  
Sago Mine Case: Media coverage of the Sago Mine accident began on January 4, 2005 
with the statement given by the mine’s owner ICG Group Inc. The bulk of media coverage 
occurred from January 6 to13, 2006. The population of stories was accessed from January 4 to 
February 1, 2006, from the first official announcement from ICG to the last official statement by 
ICG on the crisis. News stories were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the key words 
(Sago mine and ICG) which yielded 135 stories. Stories that were relevant to the crisis were 
eventually filtered to 27.  
Ford Case: Media coverage of the Ford job cutback crisis began on May 11, 2006, as 
newspapers reported on the mounting struggle of American automobile producers to keep pace 
with foreign competitors.  Coverage intensified in August and September, following Ford’s 
announcements that it would implement massive production cuts and manufacturing plant 
closings, as well as the buyout or layoff of tens of thousands of workers, as part of a massive 
corporate restructuring plan.  The population of Ford news stories published on the five 
newspapers from May 10 to September 20, 2006, were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in 
the key words (Ford and jobs) and stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered 
to 69.  
Military Commissions Act 2006:  The Central Intelligence Agency’s crisis regarding the 
treatment of suspected terrorist conspirators imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, began on 
July 12, 2006.  Responding to allegations of physical torture and unethical interrogation of 
detainees, American media questioned whether the constitutional rights of prisoners should be 
extended to alleged terrorists held abroad.  President Bush and his administration acknowledged 
the existence of secret CIA prisons hosted by foreign governments, but declined to confirm the 
exact locations of these facilities.  The population of CIA releases and news stories published on 
the five newspapers from July 12 to November 4, 2006.  News stories were uploaded from 
Lexis-Nexis by typing in the key words (CIA and Guantanamo) and stories that were relevant to 
the crisis were eventually filtered to 61. 
Coders and Training 
Two coders, both graduate students and familiar with the content analysis method, 
conducted the coding. With the help of a codebook, the coders were given detailed instruction 
and description of the various categories used. Two practice sessions were held in December 
2006 using samples of stories to familiarize with the coding instruments. The coders worked 
independently and were not allowed to consult with each other about the coding. The inter-coder 
reliability achieved .84 using Scott’s Pi.  
Coding Instrument 
The unit of analysis is defined as a press release or a news story. This includes stories by 
the staff of the newspaper and wire stories from the editors. The content analysis instrument is 
designed to evaluate the appraisal of crisis involvement and coping strategies from 
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organizations’ and their primary publics’ perspectives. The 259 stories were coded for the 
following variables: 
Organizational Involvement: First, organization’s appraisal of the relevance between 
organizational goal and the crisis, measured on a 7 point Likert like scale, where 1 was “very 
low,” and 7 was “very high”. The scale was further operationalized from 1 = The crisis has 
nothing to do with the organization’s goals, and is not likely at all to put the organization 
operation and reputation in danger; to 7 = The crisis hits the organization’s goals and creates 
devastating damage. In cases where the issues are not addressed in the stories, we coded it as 99. 
Second, organization’s appraisal of its responsibility of the crisis (measured on a 7 point 
Likert like scale, where 1 was “very low,” and 7 was “very high”).  The scale was further 
operationalized from1 = The organization has nothing to do with the crisis; to 7 = The 
organization takes full responsibility in the happening of the crisis; and 99 = Issue not addressed 
in the story. 
The same set of involvement variables were also measured from the public’s perspective 
as evidenced in the news stories. 
Primary publics’ Coping Strategy: First, primary public’s willingness to change their 
opinion of the crisis (cognitive coping) (measured on a 7 point Likert like scale, where 1 was 
“not evident,” and 7 was “very evident”). The scale was further operationalized from 1 = Public 
is willing to change its perception of the crisis, e.g. the crisis is what it is and there is no need to 
explain it further or change the angle of looking at it; to 7 = Public is extremely proactive in 
taking another look at the crisis and providing full explanation; and 99 = Issue not addressed in 
the stories. 
Second, primary public’s willingness to take actions to address the crisis (conative 
coping) (measured on a 7 point Likert like scale, where 1 was “not evident,” and 7 was “very 
evident”). The scale was further operationalized from 1 = Public is not willing to take any action 
regarding the crisis; to 7 = Public is extremely proactive in taking actions with detailed plans 
against the crisis; and 99 = Issue not addressed in the stories. The same set of coping strategy 
variables were also measured from the organization’s perspective as evidenced in the news 
stories. 
Public’s Emotion Expressed (from a list of sadness, fright, anger and sadness): First. 
primary emotion was measured on a 7 point Likert like scale, where 1 was “not evident,” and 7 
was “very evident”, scoring the highest among other negative emotions.  Second, secondary 
emotion was measured on a 7 point Likert like scale, where 1 was “not evident,” and 7 was “very 
evident”, scoring the second highest among other negative emotions. “Other Emotion” was 
required to be specified, if any, and coded in the same way.  The scale was further 
operationalized from 1 = No trace of display of emotion; to 7 = Vivid and graphic description of 
facial expression of the public and direct quote on the emotion expressed; and 99 = Emotions not 
mentioned in the story. 
 
Results 
Primary Emotions 
RQ1 examined the primary emotions displayed by the primary publics, as evidenced in 
the news coverage.  For HP case, anger was displayed as the primary emotion (M = 2.22, SD = 
1.40) while anxiety as secondary emotion (M = 2.09, SD = 1.30).  Sadness (M = 1.12, SD = .53) 
and fright (M= 1.10, SD = .45) were also evident in the news coverage.  There was no 
identifiable “other emotion”.  Anger and anxiety were highly correlated (r = .63, p < .001) but 
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there was no significant difference in terms of how evident they were in the news coverage (t = 
1.02, n.s.). 
For Dell case, anger was displayed as the primary emotion (M = 3.17, SD = 2.08) while 
anxiety as secondary emotion (M = 2.50, SD = 1.68).  Sadness (M = 1.67, SD = 1.23) and fright 
(M= 1.00, SD = .00) were also evident in the news coverage.  There was no identifiable “other 
emotion”.  Anger and anxiety were not significantly correlated (r = .26, n.s.), and there was no 
significant difference in terms of how evident they were in the news coverage (t = 1.08, n.s.). 
 For Sago Mine case, anxiety was displayed as the primary emotion (M = 4.48, SD = 
2.06) while sadness as secondary emotion (M = 3.20, SD = 2.00).  Anger (M = 2.96, SD = 2.01) 
and fright (M= 2.92, SD = 1.80) were also evident in the news coverage.  There were two 
identifiable “other emotions” (“joy” and “hope”, occurred three times and once, respectively).  
Anxiety and sadness were highly correlated (r = .60, p < .01), and there was significant 
difference in terms of how evident they were in the news coverage (t = 3.53, p < .01). 
For Ford case, anxiety was displayed as the primary emotion (M = 4.17, SD = 1.49) 
while sadness as secondary emotion (M = 2.63, SD = 1.72).  Anger (M = 1.69, SD = 1.08) and 
fright (M= 2.23, SD = 1.59) were also evident in the news coverage.  There was no identifiable 
“other emotion”.  Anxiety and sadness were highly correlated (r = .75, p < .001), and there was 
significant difference in terms of how evident they were in the news coverage (t = 7.96, p < 
.001). 
For the immigration case leading to the Military Commissions Act 2006, anxiety was 
displayed as the primary emotion (M = 2.38, SD = 1.42) while anger as secondary emotion (M = 
2.02, SD = 1.47).  Sadness (M = 1.04, SD = .29) and fright (M= 1.04, SD = .29) were also 
evident in the news coverage.  There was no identifiable “other emotion”.  Anxiety and sadness 
were significantly correlated (r = .41, p < .01), but there was no significant difference in terms of 
how evident they were in the news coverage (t = 1.58, n.s.).  
Organizational Involvement 
RQ2 examined the extent of the organizations’ involvement in the crises, as evidenced in 
the news coverage.  For HP case, the organization tended to perceive that the crisis is related to 
the organization’s goals but not closely related to the operation and/or reputation of the 
organization (M = 3.62, SD = .93); in terms of crisis responsibility, it took somewhat 
responsibility and tended to stay neutral or balanced (M = 3.75, SD = 1.09).  For Dell case, the 
similar pattern occured: the organization tended to perceive that the crisis was related to the 
organization’s goals but not closely related to the operation and/or reputation of the organization 
(M = 3.80, SD = 1.06); in terms of crisis responsibility, it took somewhat responsibility and 
tended to stay neutral or balanced (M = 4.10, SD = 1.83). 
For Sago Mine case, the organization tended to perceive that the crisis was somewhat 
closely related to the organization’s goals but not essentially relevant to the operation and/or 
reputation of the organization (M = 4.47, SD = .84); in terms of crisis responsibility, it took 
somewhat responsibility and tended to stay neutral or balanced (M = 3.64, SD = 1.09).  For Ford 
case, similarly, the organization tended to perceive that the crisis is somewhat closely related to 
the organization’s goals but not essentially relevant to the operation and/or reputation of the 
organization (M = 5.28, SD = .83); in terms of crisis responsibility, it took somewhat 
responsibility and tended to stay neutral or balanced (M = 4.30, SD = .73). 
For the immigration case, the organization tended to perceive the crisis as related to the 
organization’s goals but not closely related to the operation and/or reputation of the organization 
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(M = 4.28, SD = .70); in terms of crisis responsibility, it took somewhat responsibility and 
tended to stay neutral or balanced (M = 3.90, SD = .44). 
Primary Publics’ Coping Strategies 
RQ3 examined the primary publics’ coping strategies, as evident in the news coverage.  
For HP, the primary publics tended to use more conative coping (M = 5.14, SD = 1.09) than 
cognitive coping (M = 4.53, SD = 1.19) (t = 3.85, p < .001).  For Dell case, there was no 
significant difference in its primary publics’ coping strategy preference.  For Sago Mine case, the 
primary publics tended to use more conative coping (M = 4.79, SD = .78) than cognitive coping 
(M = 3.96, SD = 1.33) (t = 2.78, p < .05).  For Ford case, the primary publics tended to use more 
conative coping (M = 4.64, SD = .96) than cognitive coping (M = 4.27, SD = 1.21) (t = 2.43, p < 
.05). For CIA case, the primary publics tended to use more conative coping (M = 5.40, SD = .65) 
than cognitive coping (M = 4.74, SD = 1.13) (t = 4.70, p < .001). Except for the case involving 
Dell, the primary publics in all the other cases were more willing to take actions to address the 
crisis than to change their opinion of the crisis. 
Difference in Organizational Involvement Perception 
RQ4 examined the difference, if any, in perception of the degree in organizational 
involvement in each of the crises between the organization and the publics.  For HP case, the 
primary publics perceived the organization’s goals were more relevant to the crisis (M = 4.17, 
SD = 1.09) than the organization perceived themselves (M = 3.63, SD = .99) (t = 2.71, p < .05).  
The primary publics also perceived the organization had higher crisis responsibility for the crisis 
(M = 4.33, SD = .93) than the organization appraised themselves (M = 3.70, SD = 1.09) (t = 
3.91, p < .001).  For Sago Mine case, the primary publics perceived the organization’s goals 
were more relevant to the crisis (M = 5.60, SD = .70) than the organization perceived themselves 
(M = 4.40, SD = .70) (t = 3.34, p < .01).  The primary publics also perceived the organization 
had higher crisis responsibility for the crisis (M = 4.55, SD = 1.22) than the organization 
appraised themselves (M = 3.73, SD = .99) (t = 2.81, p < .05). 
For Dell, Ford and the immigration cases, there was no significant difference in 
perception of the degree in organization’s goal relevance and crisis responsibility in each of the 
crises between the organization and the primary publics. 
Difference in Coping Strategy Perception 
RQ5 examined the difference, if any, in the perception of the degree of the publics’ 
coping strategy in each of the crises between the organization and the publics.  For the HP case, 
the primary publics were more willing to take cognitive coping (M = 4.53, SD = 1.20) than the 
organization (M = 3.86, SD = 1.26) (t = 3.13, p < .01) perceived it to be. The primary publics 
were also more willing to take conative coping (M = 5.14, SD = 1.09) than the organization (M = 
4.46, SD = 1.33) (t = 3.44, p < .01) perceived it to be.  The same pattern occurs in the 
immigration case leading to the Military Commissions Act 2006, where the primary publics were 
more willing to take cognitive coping (M = 4.74, SD = 1.13) than the organization (M = 3.98, SD 
= .99) (t = 4.07, p < .001) perceived it to be. The primary publics were also more willing to take 
conative coping (M = 5.40, SD = .65) than the organization (M = 4.91, SD = 1.20) (t = 2.49, p < 
.05).  It seemed that the primary publics in these two cases were more active than the 
organizations in taking efforts to change opinions and the crisis situations. 
For Dell case, there was no significant difference in the cognitive coping strategy taken 
between the primary publics and the organization (t = 1.48, n.s.). Interestingly, the organization 
was more willing to take conative coping (M = 5.92, SD = .80) than the primary publics (M = 
4.17, SD = 1.19) (t = 3.78, p < .01).  For Ford case, there was no significant difference in the 
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cognitive coping strategy taking between the primary publics and the organization (t = 1.44, 
n.s.). Again, the organization was more willing to take conative coping (M = 5.44, SD = .91) 
than the primary publics (M = 4.63, SD = .98) (t = 3.66, p < .01).  It seemed that the 
organizations in these two cases were more active than the primary publics demanded in taking 
efforts to change opinions and the crisis situations. For Sago Mine case, there was no significant 
difference in the cognitive and conative coping strategies taking between the primary publics and 
the organization (t = 1.48, n.s.; t = 1.00, n.s., respectively). 
 
Discussion 
 The findings are distilled into two categories: What the evidence suggests as strong merit; 
and what the evidence suggests as some merit. Implications of the evidence are drawn, with 
suggestions to refine the ICM mode (see Figure 2). 
Publics’ Emotional Response: New Variations of Emotions 
 In crises which require high organizational involvement, and conative coping by the 
publics, the ICM model had posited the existence of two emotions: Anger as the primary level 
emotion which the publics experience in the immediate instance; and anxiety as the secondary 
level emotion which the publics experience in subsequent instances. The secondary level 
emotion may be transferred from the dominant emotion or coexist with the primary level. Our 
findings showed that anger and anxiety were evident in three of the five cases. Of the three, two 
showed that it was associated or co-existed with the other. Of the two emotions posited, anxiety 
was evident in all the cases studied, mostly as primary level emotion while anger was present in 
three of the five cases, either as primary or secondary level emotions. Another emotion, which 
we had posited in another quadrant, sadness, was evident in two of the five cases. Regardless of 
what the emotional combinations were, anger-anxiety, anxiety-anger, anger-sadness, anxiety-
sadness, in four of the five cases, our findings found a high likelihood that one emotion co-
existed with the other. Though anxiety is found to be evident in all five cases, it could not be said 
with certainty that anxiety was the more powerful or dominant of the two emotions. Evidence, 
thus, suggests strong merit in the existence of three variants of emotions, instead of two, in this 
quadrant. These are anger, anxiety, and sadness, with a high likelihood that one co-exists with 
the other. Evidence also suggests some merit that there may not be a distinction between primary 
and secondary level emotions, but that these emotions are often intertwined and interwoven with 
one another.  
Publics’ Coping Strategy: Evidence of Conative Coping 
In this quadrant, our ICM model had posited that the publics engage more in conative 
than cognitive coping. In conative coping, we argue that the publics try to manage the situation 
so as to alter a troubled relationship or to sustain a desirable one by taking actions or at least 
show their tendency of action. On the contrary, in cognitive coping, we argue that the publics try 
to sort out a way of thinking or interpreting the meaning of the crisis with regard to their well 
being. Findings showed that as far as the publics were concerned, in four of the five cases, they 
engaged in conative coping and regarded their own abilities and willingness to take action to 
change their perception of the crisis situation. Consequently, findings also showed that because 
they were willing to take proactive steps to deal with the crises on their ends, these publics 
expected, in two of the five cases, the organizations to do likewise and similarly engage in 
conative coping strategies to deal with the crises. Evidence thus suggests strong merit in the 
conative coping strategies of the primary publics in crises relating to reputation, technological 
breakdown, labor unrest, industrial matters and regulation and legislation.  
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Organizational involvement: Evidence of Moderate Involvement 
 Though we had posited in our model that the organizations are likely to be highly 
involved, or rather, the organizations need to be highly involved, findings showed otherwise. In 
all of the five cases studied, the organizations maintained the crises did not relate to or affect 
their operations or reputations; they did not think their organization was fully responsible for the 
crises, and they engaged in a neutral stance with regards to dealing or resolving the crisis 
involving them. These appeared to dovetail with the publics’ perception of organizational 
involvement: In three of the five cases studied, the publics shared similar perceptions with the 
organizations regarding the level of involvement of the organization. Only in two of the five 
cases did the publics want the organizations to do more. Evidence thus suggests strong merit that 
organizations embroiled in these crises need not be highly involved. A moderate level of 
involvement appeared to suffice, based on the evidence. 
Implications for ICM model 
Arguably, scant attention has been paid in the crisis literature to understand the emotions 
of the publics in crisis, be they crises involving reputation (for example, see Ihlen, 2002; Johnson 
and Peppas, 2003; Puchan, 2001); labor unrest (see Crandall & Menefee, 1996); or technological 
breakdown (see Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997), all have focused on 
organizational strategies and response. Thus far, studies on public perceptions have been limited 
to examining organizations’ prior relationship to the crisis. Lyon and Cameron (2004), for 
instance, examined the organization’s prior relationship with its publics and found the “halo 
effect” in organizations with firm reputations as “shining stars of social responsibility” (p. 231) 
to be usually afforded the benefit of the doubt in times of crises. Lee (2004), for example, sought 
to understand the publics’ judgment, impression and sympathy of the organization during a 
crisis.  
Yet, it is our thesis that studies analyzing audience reception in crises should increasingly 
dominate crisis scholarship for the simple argument that organizational strategies would be 
ineffectual if these do not appeal to the hearts and minds of the publics the organizations are 
trying to reach. Our emotion-based conceptualization is positioned as a nascent attempt to 
understand crisis from the perspectives of the publics so that organizational strategies and 
responses can be more appropriately targeted and honed.  Both organizations and their publics 
respond not only intellectually, but emotionally, to the events around them that shape the 
reputation and future of their own lives to a greater or a lesser extent. 
Given the evidence, what we can say with certainty at this juncture is that publics 
involved in crises pertaining to reputational damage, technological breakdown, industrial 
matters, labor unrest, and regulation/legislation, are likely to feel anxious, angry, and sad. At the 
same time, they are likely to engage in conative coping and take active steps to restore some 
semblance of normalcy within their immediate environment. As counter-intuitive as this may 
appear, organizations embroiled in these crises need only to engage moderately, rather than 
intensely, in reaching out to the publics. If this proves to be ultimately true, then it has 
tremendous implications on current emphasis on crisis strategies.  
 
Conclusion: What Next? 
This present study has investigated the viability of the ICM model by integrating crisis 
perspectives with psychological analyses. The ICM model is applied to an initial test of five 
types of crises that are posited to require high organizational involvement and high conative 
coping by the publics. Since this is the first empirical study exploring the model, it has provided 
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a fruitful exploratory area of research. Findings suggest theoretical rigor in the model, with room 
for further refinements. Admittedly, one limitation of this study is that the analyses are all based 
on media reports. Further research should include examination of messages disseminated through 
media releases as well as interviews with practitioners and focus groups with publics involved in 
the respective crises. 
This study is the first of a series of studies before we can generate what Yin (2003) 
termed “analytic generalization” (p. 33). Analytic generalization is achieved by testing 
empirically a theoretical model to enhance its potency and rigor. Analytic generalization, or what 
Bennett (2004) called “theory confirming and infirming” (p. 22), is achieved when “two or more 
cases” support the theoretical assertions (Yin, 2003, p. 33). With the plethora of studies 
continuing to focus on the criticality of organizational response during crisis, researchers ought 
now to take a step back to examine what we argue to be a more universal and systemic approach 
based on publics’ emotions. The findings from this study, arguably, represent the imprints of an 
initial trail that may open up to a possibly new vista of research, with the potential of 
transforming the landscape of studies of crisis communication. As poet Robert Frost wrote in 
Stopping By Woods On a Snowy Evening,  
The woods are lovely, dark and deep,  
But, I have promises to keep, 
And miles to go before I sleep. 
Our trek has just begun. 
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Figure 1: Integrated Crisis Mapping (ICM) Model (Jin, Pang, & Cameron, 2007) 
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Figure 2: New ICM Quadrant 1 
 
 
